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CHAPTER 2 
Article One: General Provisions 
ROBERT BRAUCHER 
§2.1. General. Article 1 consists of two parts and contains gen-
eral principles governing the application and interpretation of the 
rest of the Code. It is difficult without examining each of the sub-
stantive provisions of the next eight Articles to say how far these 
general provisions change the law of Massachusetts. But Article 1 
cannot be ignored: it sets the tone for the rest of the Code and affects 
the operation of every portion of the Code. The provisions of greatest 
breadth are perhaps those on variation by agreement in Section 1-102 
and those on territorial application in Section 1-105. The forty-six 
definitions in Section 1-201 affect the application of nearly every sec-
tion. Section 1-107 on discharge without consideration, Section 1-203 
on the obligation of good faith, and the changes in certain rules of 
evidence also seem particularly significant. 
§2.2. Variation by agreement. Until 1950 the Code included a 
provision that the rules of the Code which were not qualified by such 
words as "unless otherwise agreed" could not be modified by agree-
ment.1 That provision was criticized by a committee of the American 
Bar Association, and was replaced in later drafts by a provision per-
mitting contrary agreement except as to (a) definitions and formal 
requirements, (b) rights of third parties, and (c) obligations "such as" 
good faith and reasonable care. That provision was enacted in Pennsyl-
vania. Supplement No.1 revised it to place more emphasis on freedom 
of contract and to delete the unspecified limitation embodied in the 
words "such as." The New York Law Revision Commission disap-
proved the revised provision, and in 1956 the sponsors' Editorial Board 
approved the provision now found in Section 1-102 (3) of the Massa-
chusetts act. 
The present provision states affirmatively at the outset that freedom 
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Commercial Code. Some of this chapter draws on the Massachusetts Annotations, 
and on Braucher, The 1956 Revision of the Uniform Commercial Code, 2 Villanova 
L. Rev. 1 (1956). 
§2.2. lUCC §1-107 (Spring 1950 ed.); see Malcolm, The Proposed Commercial 
Code, 6 Bus. Lawyer 113, 130-131, 179-180 (1951). 
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of contract is a principle of the Code. No exception is stated for defi-
nitions or for the rights of third parties; those exceptions were deleted 
as unnecessary. The remaining exceptions are (a) "as otherwise pro-
vided in this chapter" and (b) "the obligations of good faith, dili-
gence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this chapter." Where 
the Code prescribes such an obligation, the result seems to be to limit 
the power which the parties would have under prior law to contract 
for exemption from liability for negligence.2 In such cases, however, 
the same subsection expressly permits agreement on standards of per-
formance if the standards "are not manifestly unreasonable." 
§2.3. Use of draftsmen's comments. The Code as enacted in 
Pennsylvania included Section 1-102(3)(f) and (g), expressly authoriz-
ing reference to the Comments of the sponsors in the construction and 
application of the Code. It was also provided that in the event of 
conflict between text and comment, text controlled, and that prior 
drafts of text and comments might not be used. The Massachusetts 
Code does not contain these provisions; they were deleted in the 1956 
revision because the old comments were out of date and new ones had 
not yet been prepared, and because the changes from the text enacted 
in Pennsylvania seemed to be legitimate legislative history. 
Since the enactment of the Code in Massachusetts, the sponsors have 
been preparing to publish new comments, revised in accordance with 
the revisions of the text and with the reasons given by the Editorial 
Board for those revisions. The old comments not only had official 
status in Pennsylvania; they were also adopted by a special commission 
in Massachusetts in 1954.1 It may be, therefore, that where the Massa-
chusetts text follows the Pennsylvania text, the old comments have a 
status in Massachusetts as extrinsic aids to interpretation not vastly 
different from their status in Pennsylvania.2 The Editorial Board's 
explanation of the 1956 changes, which was available to the legislature 
when the Massachusetts Code was enacted, may possibly be entitled to 
similar treatment. But it seems clear that the revised comments, not 
published until after the enactment of the Code, have no official status. 
Nonetheless, they may be very helpful to both lawyers and courts, in 
much the same way that Williston on Sales is a useful guide to the 
meaning of the Uniform Sales Act, drafted by Professor Williston. 
Their status may be compared to that of the various Restatements.8 
2 See 2 Restatement of Contracts §574; Restatement of Contracts, Mass. Annot. 
§574. 
§2.3. 1 Report of the Special Commission to Investigate and Study the Uniform 
Commercial Code, House No. 2400, (1954), pp. 16-17, 201. 
2 Cf. Tilton v. Haverhill, 311 Mass. 572, 42 N.E.2d 588 (1942); New Bedford v. 
New Bedford, Woods Hole, etc., Steamship Authority, 330 Mass. 422, 114 N.E.2d 
553 (1953); Budget Plan, Inc. v. Savoy. 1957 Mass. Adv. Sh. 983, 990n, 145 N.E.2d 
710,715. 
3 Cf. Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Consolidated Fisheries Co., 190 F.2d 817, 822n 
(3d Cir. 1951); Alaska Pacific Salmon Co. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 163 F.2d 643, 
657n (2d Cir. 1947). 
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§2.4. Territorial application. In its original form Section 1-105, 
providing for choice of law, aroused almost universal opposition among 
teachers of conflict of laws.1 The New York Law Revision Commission 
proposed that the section be deleted altogether and the subject left 
wholly to the common law.2 The Editorial Board chose instead to re-
write the section. Subject to specific choice-of-Iaw rules set forth in 
other sections, the revised section expressly authorizes parties to agree 
that the law of a particular state shall govern whenever the transaction 
bears a "reasonable relation" to the chosen state. Failing such agree-
ment the Code applies to transactions bearing an "appropriate rela-
tion" to the enacting state. 
As to choice of law by agreement, the Code seems to be consistent 
with prior Massachusetts law.s As for the concept of an "appropriate" 
relation, the Official Comment invites consideration of practical con-
sequences in the manner of recent decisions under New York law.4 
Such an approach finds some support in recent Massachusetts cases, 
although traditionally many contract issues have been decided by 
Massachusetts courts under the law of the place of contracting.1I 
§2.5. Release without consideration. Under Section 1-107, "Any 
claim or right arising out of an alleged breach can be discharged in 
whole or in part without consideration by a written waiver or renun-
ciation signed and delivered by the aggrieved party." The italicized 
words appear in the Massachusetts Code but not in the Pennsylvania 
Code. In its setting this provision seems to be limited to discharge 
after breach of an obligation arising under the Code. Similar provi-
sions as to sale contracts and negotiable instruments apply before 
breach as welJ.1 
§2.6. Good faith. The provision for release without considera-
tion, like all other provisions of the Code, must be read in the light of 
the pervasive obligation of "good faith" established by Section 1-203 
in the "performance or enforcement" of "every contract or duty within" 
the Code. "Good faith" is defined in Section 1-201 (19) to mean 
"honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." In Article 
2 on Sales, "good faith" in the case of a merchant "includes the ob-
servance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the 
§2.4. 1 See, e.g., Rheinstein, Conflict of Laws in the Uniform Commercial Code, 
16 Law &: Contemp. Prob. 114 (1951). But see Goodrich, Conflicts Niceties and Com-
mercial Necessities, 1952 Wis. L. Rev. 199. 
2 N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 65(A), pp. 23-25 (1956). 
S See Jewett v. Keystone Driller Co., 282 Mass. 469, 475, 185 N.E. 1169, 371 (191111). 
But cf. Harwood v. Security Mutual Life Ins. Co., 263 Mass. 341, 161 N.E. 589 
(1928). The Official Comment cites Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 
U.S. 403, 47 Sup. Ct. 626, 71 L. Ed. 1123 (1927). 
4 See Global Commerce Corp. v. Clark-Babbitt Industries, Inc., 2119 F.2d 716, 
719 (2d Cir. 1956). 
1\ See Lavoie's Case, 334 Mass. 403, 406, 135 N.E.2d 750, 752 (1956), cert. denied, 
352 U.S. 927 (1956) (workmen's compensation); Budget Plan, Inc. v. Sterling A. 
Orr, Inc., 334 Mass. 599, 601n, 137 N.E.2d 918, 920n (1956) (conditional sale). 
§2.5. 1 VCC §§2-209 (1), 3-605 (1). 
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trade" 1 (emphasis supplied). The italicized words, not found in the 
Pennsylvania text, were added on the recommendation of the New 
York Law Revision Commission; they bring to mind a recent reference 
by the New York Court of Appeals to "the good old rule that there is 
in every contract an implied covenant of fair dealing." 2 
The standard of "honesty in fact" is traditionally the subjective 
standard of "the pure heart and the empty head." The absence of 
any general obligation to follow the objective standard of the "reason-
able man" is emphasized by the history of the Code obligation of 
good faith. In the Spring 1950 edition the general definition of good 
faith included "observance by a person of the reasonable commercial 
standards of any business or trade in which he is engaged." The quoted 
language was criticized by a committee of the American Bar Associa-
tion,3 and was deleted by the sponsors from the general definition. 
But similar language was inserted at strategic points in the text pro-
mulgated by the sponsors and adopted in Pennsylvania.4 Reference 
to "reasonable commercial standards" in the definition of a holder in 
due course of a negotiable instrument was the subject of voluminous 
discussion in the proceedings of the New York Law Revision Commis-
sion, where vigorous objection was made on behalf of the Chase Na-
tional Bank.5 The Editorial Board deleted the offending language, and 
the New York Commission approved. 
In the Massachusetts Code there remain two references to "good 
faith including observance of reasonable commercial standards." 6 In 
two other sections reference to action "in good faith and in accordance 
with" such standards suggests that good faith may not include their 
observance.7 In the Sales Article "good faith" and "fair dealing" have 
the connotation quoted above. Elsewhere in the Code "good faith" 
stands as "honesty in fact." This adoption of the subjective standard 
leaves open the possibility that unreasonable conduct may provide 
evidence relevant to the issue of good faith. In view of that possibility, 
the difference between subjective and objective standards, however 
important to linguistic artistry, may well have no significant effect on 
the outcome of litigation. A lower court decision in Pennsylvania, 
applying the "reasonable commercial standards" provision, tends to 
confirm such a judgment.8 
§2.6. 1 UCC §2-103 (1) (b). 
2 See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Tailored Woman, Inc., 309 N.Y. 248, 254, 128 
N.E.2d 401, 403 (1955). 
3 See Malcolm, The Proposed Commercial Code, 6 Bus. Lawyer 113, 126-128 
(1951). 
4 UCC §§2-103(1)(b), 3-302(1)(b), 7-501(4) (1952 ed.). 
1\ See 1954 Report of N.Y. Law Rev. Comm., 203-206,213-243,418,424-426,518-531, 
1318, 1408, 1457-1458; see also Report of Committee on Uniform Commercial Code, 
American Bankers' Assn., Oct. 17, 1954, pp. 17-18,24-27; UCC Supp. No. I, pp. 18-19 
(Jan. 1955); N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 65(A), p. 17 (1956). 
6 VCC §§7-404, 8-318. 
7Id. §§3-406, 3-419 (3). 
8 First National Bank v. Anderson, 7 D. & C. 2d 661 (Pa. C.P. 1956); cf. state-
ment of Professor Sutherland in 1954 Report of N.Y. Law Rev. Comm. 243. 
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§2.7. Notice. Like "good faith" and "value," "notice" is a per-
vasive concept in the Code, especially in the numerous provisions on 
the effect of a good faith purchase for value without notice of a claim 
or defense.1 Section 1-201 (25) through (27) distinguishes four con-
cepts used throughout the Code. First, one person "notifies" or "gives" 
a notice to another by taking reasonable steps to inform him. Second, 
a notice or notification is "received" when it is delivered at a place held 
out by the recipient as the place for receipt of such communications. 
Third, a person has "notice" of a fact when he knows it, when he has 
received a notice of it, or when he has "reason to know" that it exists. 
Fourth, "know," "discover" or "learn" refers to actual knowledge 
rather than to reason to know. 
The 1956 changes in these definitions were "based on a study of all 
the provisions of the Code relating to knowledge, notice or notifica-
tion." 2 One of the changes was the addition of the following sentence: 
"The time and circumstances under which a notice or notification may 
cease to be effective are not determined by this Act." At the same time 
there was deleted a provision that a purchaser was charged with notice 
that securities had been lost or stolen for six months after receipt of 
notification to that effect.s The result seems to be to leave to judicial 
decision the effect of "forgotten notice." 4 
An important limitation on notice, knowledge, or a notice or notifi-
cation received by an organization is contained in Section 1-201 (27). 
The organization is bound by a standard of due diligence in communi-
cation to the individual conducting the transaction to which the 
notice is relevant. The effect seems similar to that of provisions for 
"reasonable opportunity to act" on a notice.1i 
§2.8. Value. Section 1-201 (44) provides a new definition of 
"value," consolidating three separate definitions appearing in the 
Pennsylvania text.1 Separate definitions remain, however, for nego-
tiable instruments and bank collections.2 The rule of Swift v. Tyson,S 
that value is given when a negotiable instrument is taken on account 
of an antecedent debt, is made applicable generally; where a contrary 
result is intended, it is provided for separately from the element of 
value, as in the general definition of "buyer in ordinary course of busi-
ness" and in the definition for documents of title of "duly negotiate." 4 
§2.7. 1 See, generally, Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Pur-
chase, 63 Yale L.J. 1057 (1954). 
21956 Recommendations of the Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial 
Code §1-20l, Reason 25. 
S UCC §8·304(I)(b) (1952 ed.). 
4 Cf. Graham v. White-Phillips Co., 296 U.S. 27, 56 Sup. Ct., 21, 80 L. Ed. 20 
(1935). 
5 UCC §§4-403(1), 8·403 (I) (a); d. Uniform Bills of Lading Act §33. 
§2.8. 1 UCC §§7-102(1) (g) , 8-303, 9-108 (I) (1952 ed.). 
2 UCC §§3-303, 4-208, 4-209. 
s 16 Pet. I, 10 L. Ed. 865 (U.s. 1842). 
4 uec §§1-201(9), 7-501(4). 
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The principal difference between the negotiable instrument defini-
tion in Article 3 and the general definition in Article 1 relates to the 
status of an executory promise as value. In Article 3 value is given "to 
the extent that the agreed consideration has been performed," when a 
negotiable instrument is given, or when an "irrevocable commitment" 
is made to a third person. The general definition includes "a binding 
commitment to extend credit" and "the extension of immediately avail-
able credit," even though not drawn upon and even though there is a 
right of charge-bank. In Article 4 on bank collections, credit may be 
value though not drawn upon, but as to "an item deposited in an 
account" value is given "to the extent to which credit given for the 
item has been withdrawn or applied" on a "first-in, first-out" basis. As 
a result of these provisions, value may sometimes be given for goods 
or documents but not for an accompanying negotiable instrument. 
And in some cases it may become important whether an item has been 
"deposited in an account." 
§2.9. Acceleration clauses. Section 1-208 provides that a term for 
acceleration of payment or performance by one party "when he deems 
himself insecure" shall be construed to permit acceleration only if he 
"in good faith believes that the prospect of payment or performance 
is impaired." The burden of establishing lack of good faith is placed 
on the other party. These provisions should be read in conjunction 
with the provision of Article 3 that an acceleration clause does not 
impair the negotiability of commercial paper.1 
Section 1-208 has been attacked as an unjustifiable interference with 
freedom of contract, and defended as a clarifying restatement of 
prior law; it has also been suggested that the law in some states is less 
favorable to the lender in that he bears the burden of proving his 
own good faith and reasonable conduct.2 It seems very likely that there 
will be continuing efforts to secure legislation protecting retail install-
ment buyers against acceleration "arbitrarily and without reasonable 
cause." 3 The position of the sponsors of the Code has been that such 
legislation should be enacted separately from the Code.4 
§2.l0. Miscellaneous. The foregoing are not the only significant 
provisions of Article 1. Space does not permit further elaboration, but 
mention should be made of Section 1-202, making certain third-party 
documents prima facie evidence of the facts stated in them; Section 
1-205, defining the role of course of dealing and usage of trade; Section 
1-206, providing a novel Statute of Frauds for the sale of certain types 
of intangibles; and Section 1-207, authorizing performance and ac-
ceptance of performance "without prejudice." 
§2.9. 1 UCC §§3-109(1)(c), 3-104(1). 
2See, e.g., 1954 Report of N.Y. Law Rev. Comm. 260-262, 1030, 1316; Malcolm, 
The Proposed Commercial Code, 6 Bus. Lawyer 113, 181 (1951). 
3 See N.Y. Personal Property Law §§302(13), 403(3)(b). 
4 See Notes to §§9-102, 9-203 (1952 ed.). 
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